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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The police detained Israel Castro Tellez while they executed a search warrant for a
residence. Mr. Tellez moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of his unlawful
detention. The district court denied his motion, and Mr. Tellez entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion. On appeal, Mr. Tellez
contends that the district court erred by denying his motion because the search warrant did not
justify his warrantless detention. The evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of the
unlawful detention, and this Court should reverse the district court’s order.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On February 7, 2017, at least six police officers1 with the City of Caldwell Police
Department went to execute a misdemeanor search warrant for a residence in a small
neighborhood with single-family homes. (Tr. Vol. I,2 p.9, L.7–p.10, L.17; Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.18,
Ls.9–11.3) The search warrant was for “drugs and paraphernalia.” (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.3, Ls.14–
16.) When the officers were about four houses away from the residence, two of the officers saw a
man walk out of the residence and towards a red car parked on the street. (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, L.18–
p.11, L.1.) The police detained the man, later identified as Mr. Tellez. (Tr. Vol. I, p.11, Ls.19–
21, p.38, L.25–p.41, L.3.) Mr. Tellez was not mentioned in the search warrant. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17,
Ls.21–23.) Sometime during Mr. Tellez’s detention, another officer ran his drug dog around the

1

One of the officer’s body cam videos shows nine or ten officers. (State’s Ex. 1, 0:57–1:05.)
There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the motion to
suppress hearing, held on May 2, 2017, the district court’s first ruling on the suppression motion,
held on May 9, 2017, the district court’s second ruling on the suppression motion, held on
May 23, 2017, and the sentencing hearing, held on June 24, 2017. The second, cited as Volume
II, contains the entry of plea hearing, held on May 23, 2017.
2

1

red car. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.22, Ls.5–17.) The dog alerted. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.22, Ls.18–24.)
The car was searched, and the police found marijuana and paraphernalia inside. (Tr. Vol. I, p.16,
Ls.11–19; Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.5, L.1–p.6, L.8, p.23, Ls.2–6.)
Based on the contraband found in the car, the State alleged Mr. Tellez committed the
crimes of felony possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with the intent to deliver,
felony possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) over three ounces, and misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.8–9.) The magistrate held a preliminary hearing and
bound Mr. Tellez over for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, but
dismissed the other felony count for possession of a controlled substance over three ounces. 4
(R., p.16; Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.29, Ls.14–21.) The State subsequently charged Mr. Tellez with
felony possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.17–18.)
Mr. Tellez moved to suppress evidence on the grounds that it was illegally obtained in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. (R., pp.21, 33–43, 60–61.) He argued that the search
warrant for the residence did not give the police the authority to detain him and, therefore, any
evidence was the fruit of his unlawful detention. (R., pp.33–43.) The State objected. (R., pp.54–
58.)
On May 2, 2017, the district court held a hearing on the motion. (See generally Tr. Vol. I,
p.5, L.1–p.55, L.17.) The district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript.

3

The preliminary hearing transcript is contained in the record as an exhibit.
The State refiled this dismissed count (felony possession of a controlled substance over three
ounces) in a new case: CR-2017-3469. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.5, Ls.13–15.) The district court
consolidated the cases. (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, L.25–p.6, L.3.) As part of the plea agreement, the State
dismissed the case (CR-2017-3469), so it is not before this Court on appeal. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5,
Ls.4–9.)
4

2

(Tr. Vol. I, p.50, L.23–p.51, L.6.) The State submitted testimony from four officers who were
present during the execution of the search warrant, as well as three body cam videos.
First, Officer Crupper testified that he observed Mr. Tellez walk out of the residence
towards a red Volkswagen Jetta parked on the street in front of the house. (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, L.18–
p.11, L.1.) Officer Crupper did not see Mr. Tellez go into the car because another car blocked his
view. (Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.13–24.) Officer Crupper’s body cam video shows an individual
(presumably Mr. Tellez) in the distance walking across the sidewalk:

[11 1,] [brakes] [lights]

Scott Crupper
VHD2-000707

(State’s Ex. 1,5 0:10–0:16 (arrow added).) As Officer Crupper gets closer to the residence, his
body cam video shows Mr. Tellez standing in the street and facing the officers, first with his
hands in his pockets and then quickly with his hands up:

5

The CD with State’s Exhibit 1 contains multiple video files. The State only admitted one of the
videos. This video is contained in the folder titled “ScottCrupper 201702071751 VHD2000707
32224388.”
3

02/07/FT FT-: 52:26

[lights]
[rlllC·] [brakes]
__

(State’s Ex. 1, 1:10–1:15; see also State’s Ex. 3, 1:47–1:51.6) In this screenshot captured from
the body cam video, the residence to be searched is directly to the left of the officer, and the red
car is to the left of Mr. Tellez.
Second, Officer Gregory testified that he saw Mr. Tellez walk out of the residence, down
the driveway, across the sidewalk, and towards a red car. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, L.25–p.22, L.6.)
Officer Gregory also testified that he saw Mr. Tellez open the front door, but he was not sure
whether Mr. Tellez reached inside or entered the car. (Tr. Vol. I, p.22, Ls.16–23.) Officer
Gregory explained, “He finished doing whatever he was doing in the car and then started
walking back into the residence, looked up and seen us and appeared to be surprised.” (Tr. Vol. I,
p.22, Ls.9–12.) In Officer Gregory’s body cam video, Mr. Tellez can be seen reaching into his

6

The CD with State’s Exhibit 3 also contains multiple video files. Again, the State only admitted
one video in the folder titled “StevenFisher 201702071750 VHD2000428 34793927.”
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car on the driver’s side, shutting the door, and then walking back down the street towards the
residence’s driveway:

[niic] [brakes) [lights]

Joshua Gregory
VHD2-000447

(State’s Ex. 2, 00:56–1:07.)
Next, Officer Cardwell testified that he was ordered to detain Mr. Tellez. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.30, Ls.1–10.) Officer Cardwell saw Mr. Tellez near the driver’s side doorway and detained
him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.30, Ls.9–10, p.31, Ls.3–11, p.38, L.25–p.41, L.3.)
Finally, Officer Geisel testified that he observed Mr. Tellez standing in an open doorway
of the red car. (Tr. Vol. I, p.46, Ls.14–23.)
After the hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement. The district court
issued two separate oral rulings denying the motion. First, on May 9, 2017, the district court
reasoned—although it was never argued by the State—that Mr. Tellez’s detention was “totally
unrelated to the search” of his car because the dog alert established probable cause. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.57, L.7–p.59, L.18.) Then, on May 23, 2017, the district court issued a second oral ruling on

5

the motion. (Tr. Vol. I, p.61, L.5–p.67, L.18.) In this ruling, the district court reasoned that the
execution of the search warrant allowed the officers to detain Mr. Tellez. (Tr. Vol. I, p.63, L.10–
p.66, L.25.) Neither the district court nor the parties7 referenced the first May 9 ruling. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.61, L.5–p.67, L.18.) In fact, at the beginning of the hearing, the district court identified its
decision on the motion as “pending.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.61, Ls.9–10.) The district court’s only
discussion of the drug dog alert, during this second ruling, was in relation to the legality of
length of Mr. Tellez’s detention. (Tr. Vol. I, p.67, Ls.1–14.)
Later that day, Mr. Tellez entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to deliver. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, Ls.14–16, p.13, L.13–p.14, L.16.) The State
agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor paraphernalia charge. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, Ls.16–17; R., p.96.)
As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Tellez reserved his right to appeal the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, Ls.14–16, p.5, Ls.13–19)
On June 2, 2017, the district court issued an order denying Mr. Tellez’s motion to
suppress “for the reasons stated on the record at the hearing held May 23, 2017.” (R., p.86.) The
order further stated that a copy of the transcript of the May 23 hearing was attached to the order
“wherein said Decision was announced on the record.” (R., p.86.) This order made no reference
to the May 9 ruling.
The district court sentenced Mr. Tellez to three years, with two years fixed, suspended
execution of the sentence, and placed Mr. Tellez on probation for three years. (R., pp.98–100.)
Mr. Tellez timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.108–10.)

7

The same prosecutor was present at both hearings, but Mr. Tellez had a different defense
attorney (both public defenders) at each hearing. (See R., pp.69, 77.)
6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Tellez’s motion to suppress?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Tellez’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mr. Tellez asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress

because the search warrant for the residence did not allow the officers to detain him. Mr. Tellez
was not in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched, the intrusion on his liberty was
substantial, and none of the justifications for a warrantless detention during the execution of a
search warrant were present. Further, Mr. Tellez contends that the district court’s alternative
basis for denying his suppression motion (the drug dog alert) was unsupported by the evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). “The Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by
substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570. The Court exercises free
review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney,
153 Idaho at 408.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Tellez’s Motion To Suppress Because The
Officers Unlawfully Detained Him During Their Execution Of A Search Warrant
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he right of the people

8

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015) (alteration in
original). “A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause, is
presumptively unreasonable.” Hansen, 138 Idaho at 796. “When a warrantless search or seizure
is challenged by the defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to
the warrant requirement is applicable.” Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002); State v.
Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2014) (same).
One exception allows law enforcement to detain individuals while executing a search
warrant. “When law enforcement officers are executing a search warrant on a premises, officers
are allowed to briefly detain the occupants of the premises described in the warrant.” State v.
Davis, 158 Idaho 857, 860 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705
(1981)). This exception (the Summers rule) “extends farther” than others “because it does not
require law enforcement to have particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal
activity or poses a specific danger to the officers.” Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 193
(2013).

1.

Mr. Tellez Was Not In The Immediate Vicinity Of The Premises To Be Searched

For this exception to apply, the detained individual must be “in the immediate vicinity of
the premises to be searched.” Bailey, 568 U.S. at 201. The U.S. Supreme Court has
“circumscribed” this exception to the premises because it “grants substantial authority to police
officers to detain outside of the traditional rules of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 200. “A spatial
constraint defined by the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched is therefore required
for detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant.” Id. at 201. “On the premises”
includes “occupants detained were found within or immediately outside a residence at the

9

moment the police officers executed the search warrant.” Id. at 193; see Summers, 452 U.S. at
693 (lawfully detaining an occupant “descending the front steps” of the residence). On the other
hand, “on the premises” does not include occupants that exited the residence just before the
execution of the search warrant (without knowledge of the warrant or the officers), drove from
the residence, and were detained about mile away. Bailey, 568 U.S. at 189, 201. These examples
represent opposite ends of the spectrum: an occupant inside the residence is on the premises, but
an occupant a mile away from the residence is not. “In closer cases,” the U.S. Supreme Court
indicated a totality of the circumstances test would be appropriate. Id. at 201. The courts should
“consider a number of factors to determine whether an occupant was detained within the
immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched, including the lawful limits of the premises,
whether the occupant was within the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from the
occupant’s location, and other relevant factors.” Id.
Applying Summers and its progeny, Idaho appellate courts “allowed detentions of people
who are ‘found on the premises to be searched who are not readily ascertainable as residents or
occupants.’” Davis, 158 Idaho at 860 (quoting State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296, 298 (Ct. App.
2002)). “Similarly,” the Idaho Court of Appeals “held that a person who walked through the
front yard of a premises being searched could be detained for the limited purpose of determining
the person’s identity and connection to the premises.” Id. at 861 (citing State v. Kester, 137 Idaho
643, 646 (Ct. App. 2002)). Recently, the Idaho Courts of Appeals held that law enforcement,
executing a search warrant for an apartment, lawfully detained a non-resident who walked down
a communal sidewalk and turned toward the common entrance shared by the apartment complex.
Davis, 158 Idaho at 859, 861–62. This individual was in the immediate vicinity of the apartment
because he was “8 to 10 feet, at the most” from the stairs leading up to the apartment. Id. at 862.
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Here, Mr. Tellez’s detention was unlawful because he was “detained at a point beyond
any reasonable understanding of the immediate vicinity of the premises in question.” Bailey, 568
U.S. at 201. Mr. Tellez was not inside the residence, on the front steps of the residence, on the
front lawn, or in the driveway. He was on the street. Although the officers observed him walking
back towards the residence, Mr. Tellez was stopped in the road before he even got to the
sidewalk. Therefore, he was not in the immediate vicinity of the premises when the officers
detained him. Mr. Tellez’s warrantless detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

2.

Law Enforcement’s Justifications For Warrantless Detentions Are Not Present In
This Case, But The Intrusion On Mr. Tellez’s Personal Liberty Is Substantial

In determining whether law enforcement can lawfully detain an individual while
executing a search warrant, the courts also examine the nature of the intrusion and the
justifications for the detention. See Bailey, 568 U.S. at 194–200; Davis, 158 Idaho at 861–62;
Pierce, 137 Idaho at 300–01. The justifications are (1) “the legitimate law enforcement interest
in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found,” (2) “the interest in
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers,” and (3) “the orderly completion of the search may
be facilitated if the occupants of the premises are present.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 702–03. These
justifications all serve “to preserve the integrity of the search by controlling those persons who
are on the scene.” Bailey, 568 U.S. at 198. If “the character of the additional intrusion caused by
detention is slight” and the justifications are met, the detention is “appropriate.” Muehler v.
Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 701–05); see also Bailey, 568 U.S. at
194–200.
In this case, the intrusion on Mr. Tellez’s personal liberty is substantial, and the three law
enforcement justifications are not satisfied. Turning to the level of intrusion first, the U.S.
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Supreme Court recognized that the detention of an individual in his or her own residence
“represents only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the search of a home has been
authorized by a valid warrant.” Bailey, 568 U.S. at 200 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703). The
U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that a detention in the individual’s home “could add only
minimally to the public stigma associated with the search itself and would involve neither the
inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police station.” Id. In
contrast, a detention away from the individual’s home is “public” and resembles “a full-fledged
arrest.” Id. The individual will be subject to an initial detention, then “suffer the additional
indignity of a compelled transfer back to the premises,” and finally be detained at the premises to
be searched. Id. This is much more intrusive than the detention of an occupant already inside the
premises. Id. Here, while Mr. Tellez was not far from the residence to be searched, his detention
was public. A uniformed police officer detained him in “almost the middle of the road.”
(Tr., p.34, Ls.7–12; see also Tr., p.30, L.1–p.31, L.17, p.33, L.22–p.40, L.22 (officer’s
discussion of detention).) The officers’ body cam videos show Mr. Tellez being frisked in the
road and later compelled inside the residence while handcuffed. (Tr., p.40, L.23–p.41, L.3;
State’s Ex. 1, 5:39–6:01; State’s Ex. 3, 1:59–2:22.) This intrusion is far more invasive than a
detention originating inside the residence to be searched. Thus, the nature of the intrusion weighs
in favor of an unreasonable seizure.
Turning to the three justifications, the district court erred by ruling that they were met in
this case. First, the district court determined that “the interest in minimizing the risk of harm to
the officers” was present because Mr. Tellez appeared to be walking back towards the residence
as the officers approached the residence. (Tr., p.63, L.23–p.64, L.14.) However, the U.S.
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Supreme Court in Bailey emphasized that the risk that individuals will likely return to the
premises does not justify their detention. 568 U.S. at 195–96. The Bailey Court reasoned:
The risk that a resident might return home, either for reasons unrelated to the
search or after being alerted by someone at the scene, exists whether he left five
minutes or five hours earlier. Unexpected arrivals by occupants or other persons
accustomed to visiting the premises might occur in many instances. Were police
to have the authority to detain those persons away from the premises, the
authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant would reach
beyond the rationale of ensuring the integrity of the search by detaining those who
are in fact on the scene.
Id. at 196. The Court also rejected the concern that the limited authority to detain only “on the
premises” would put law enforcement at risk of “departing occupants.” Id. at 196. It was argued
that those departing occupants could be a danger to the police, alert those still inside the
residence, or evade arrest. Id. at 196–97. The Bailey Court was unpersuaded by all of these
hypothetical safety rationales. The Bailey Court explained:
If the officers find that it would be dangerous to detain a departing individual in
front of a residence, they are not required to stop him. And, where there are
grounds to believe the departing occupant is dangerous, or involved in criminal
activity, police will generally not need Summers to detain him at least for brief
questioning, as they can rely instead on Terry.8
The risk that a departing occupant might notice the police surveillance and
alert others still inside the residence is also an insufficient safety rationale to
justify expanding the existing categorical authority to detain so that it extends
beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. If extended in this
way the rationale would justify detaining anyone in the neighborhood who could
alert occupants that the police are outside, all without individualized suspicion of
criminal activity or connection to the residence to be searched.
Bailey, 568 U.S. at 196–97. As explored in Bailey, the mere risk that Mr. Tellez might return to
the residence does not justify his warrantless detention outside the premises. If Mr. Tellez had
“rushed back” to the residence, then certainly the police “could have could have apprehended
and detained him under Summers.” Bailey, 568 U.S. at 196. But, because Mr. Tellez immediately
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stopped in the road and put his hands up upon seeing the officers, the officers did not have any
justification for his detention at that point. Mr. Tellez should have been free to leave the area.
Moreover, the district court found that Mr. Tellez had no “outward indications” of a risk and
“never gave such indications.” (Tr., p.64, Ls.7–9.) If those risks were present, as recognized in
Bailey, the officers were not without recourse. The officers could have detained Mr. Tellez
pursuant to Terry. See Bailey, 568 U.S. at 196–97. But, again, because Mr. Tellez was not
suspected of any criminal activity9 and the State put forth no evidence of any alleged
dangerousness, the officers did not have any justification for his detention to minimize their risk
of harm. Therefore, this first law enforcement justification also weighs in favor of an
unreasonable seizure.
Second, the district court erred by ruling that “some element of allowing the orderly
completion of the search warrant” justified Mr. Tellez’s detention. (Tr., p.64, L.25–p.65, L.1.)
This second justification—that “the orderly completion of the search may be facilitated if the
occupants of the premises are present”—has two components. Bailey, 568 U.S. at 197 (quoting
Summers, 452 U.S. at 703). One component involves the concern that occupants would “wander
around the premises” and interfere with the execution of the search warrant by hiding or
destroying evidence, distracting the officers, or simply getting in the way. Id. The second
component is the occupant’s assistance with the search, such as opening locked doors and
containers for the officers. Id. at 197–98. Neither component is present here. First, Mr. Tellez
was not a threat to the proper execution of the search when he was outside the premises. “Had he
returned,” such as going back into the house or informing the officers that he wished to be

8

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), allows an officer to conduct an investigatory detention
based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
9
Notably, Mr. Tellez was not named in the warrant. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, Ls.21–23.)
14

present during the search, “officers would have been free to detain him at that point.” Id. at 197.
“A general interest in avoiding obstruction of a search, however, cannot justify detention beyond
the vicinity of the premises to be searched.” Id. Second, there was no evidence that Mr. Tellez
could have provided any assistance during the execution of the search warrant. Mr. Tellez did
not live at that house. (Tr., p.14, Ls.3–11.) He frequently visited the house because his girlfriend
lived there, and he happened to be visiting her when the police came to execute the warrant, but
he was not a resident. (Tr., p.14, Ls.3–8, p.37, Ls.5–6.) His detention therefore only served “a
general interest in avoiding obstruction,” which is insufficient to satisfy this second justification.
Finally, the third justification—the “legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found”—is also lacking here. The district court
determined:
There is no indication that defendant intended to flee, but, rather, all of the facts
indicate he intended to go back into the residence.10 But his detention to prevent
him from leaving should he have changed his mind I think is appropriate in this
case given the fact that he had just exited that residence also.
(Tr., p.65, Ls.5–11.) The district court’s consideration of Mr. Tellez’s potential flight from the
residence, presumably due to the officers finding incriminating evidence, is not the proper
inquiry for this justification. This justification is not concerned with the hypothetical flight of an
individual outside the premises or with flight to evade arrest. “The concern over flight is not
because of the danger of flight itself but because of the damage that potential flight can cause to
the integrity of the search.” Bailey, 568 U.S. at 199. “If police officers are concerned about
flight, and have to keep close supervision of occupants who are not restrained, they might rush
the search, causing unnecessary damage to property or compromising its careful execution.” Id.

10

The only indication Mr. Tellez intended to go back into the residence was his behavior in
walking down the street back towards the driveway of the residence before he saw the officers.
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at 198. “Allowing officers to secure the scene by detaining those present also prevents the search
from being impeded by occupants leaving with the evidence being sought or the means to find
it.” Id. Here, Mr. Tellez did not threaten the integrity of the search of the house. Mr. Tellez was
outside the house when the officers began their execution of the warrant, so he was not in the
position of an occupant, who could obtain evidence being sought inside the house and flee. If
Mr. Tellez had re-entered the premises, then the officers would have had the authority to detain
him. But, the detention of Mr. Tellez outside the premises to prevent him from fleeing “should
he have changed his mind” did not justify his warrantless detention. It is equally unavailing to
justify a detention to prevent flight for efficiency or timesaving purposes. Even if Mr. Tellez’s
detention—as “a former occupant away from the premises”—“could facilitate a later arrest
should incriminating evidence be discovered, ‘the mere fact that law enforcement may be made
more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. at 199
(quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)). In short, the convenience to the officers
by detaining Mr. Tellez now in order to arrest him later cannot validate the detention in the first
place. As in the other two justifications, this one also is inadequate to permit Mr. Tellez’s
warrantless detention.
In sum, none of the law enforcement justifications for a warrantless detention during the
execution of a search warrant are present here. These justifications, which serve only “to
preserve the integrity of the search,” Bailey, 568 U.S. at 198, fail to apply with any force to the
detention of a non-resident, non-occupant on a public road outside of the premises. Further, the
intrusive nature of the detention on Mr. Tellez’s personal liberty strongly outweighs the
justifications, if any. Therefore, Mr. Tellez’s warrantless detention violated the Fourth
Amendment, and the district court erred by denying Mr. Tellez’s motion to suppress.
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D.

The Evidence In The Record Is Insufficient To Show Mr. Tellez’s Detention Was
Unrelated To The Drug Dog Alert
In its first ruling, at a hearing on May 9, the district court denied Mr. Tellez’s motion to

suppress on a basis that was not argued by either party. The district court explained:
During part of [the execution of the search warrant] one of the officers
approaching -- I believe it was Officer Fisher, who had a canine -- and after the
search warrant or during the search warrant, it’s exactly unclear, but either during
or shortly after he ran the canine around Mr. Tellez’s red vehicle that was outside,
the canine alerted on the vehicle indicating that there were items in there.
Mr. Tellez was then talked to again and admitted that a duffle bag in that
vehicle was his. Inside that duffle bag were found the drugs that are the nature of
these charges in this case.
So really the detention of Mr. Tellez is unrelated to the actual search
because the search resulted from the drug dog’s alert on the vehicle while
Mr. Tellez was there and no indication that he intended to leave at that time. Once
the drug dog alerted on the vehicle, the officers had probable cause to search the
vehicle under the vehicle exception of the warrant requirement, even though the
vehicle was not included on the original warrant, and it was during that search
when the drug items were found.
So the Court is going to deny the motion to suppress because it was raised
on the basis the officers had no reason to detain Mr. Tellez. But in fact,
Mr. Tellez’s detention was totally unrelated to the search that actually occurred,
running the drug dog around the car and the search that occurred as a result of the
drug dog’s alert on the car.
(Tr., p.58, L.12–p.59, L.16.) Essentially, the district court reasoned that the legality of
Mr. Tellez’s detention was not relevant to the suppression of the evidence found in his car.
Now on appeal, Mr. Tellez submits that this Court should reject the district court’s
alternative reasoning for its denial of his suppression motion. First, Mr. Tellez contends that the
district court implicitly reconsidered its own decision by addressing the suppression motion
again on May 23. In the May 23 oral ruling, the district court identified the motion as “pending,”
made factual findings, and provided legal conclusions. (See Tr., p.61, L.5–p.65, L.4.) Moreover,
the district court’s written order references the May 23 hearing only. (R., p.86.) As such, this
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second ruling should control. Mr. Tellez submits that this Court should not consider the district
court’s May 9 ruling on appeal.
Second, even if the May 9 ruling stands, Mr. Tellez asserts that there was insufficient
evidence for the district court to determine that an exception to the exclusionary rule did not
require the suppression of the evidence found in Mr. Tellez’s car. “The exclusionary rule
requires the suppression of both ‘primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search
or seizure’ and, pertinent here, ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an
illegality,’ the proverbial ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720
(2017) (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)). “To determine whether to
suppress evidence as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ the court must inquire whether the evidence
has been recovered as a result of the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846,
103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004) (citation omitted); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
488 (1963) (quoting MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT, 221 (1959) (“[T]he more apt question . . . is
“whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”). Here, the district court did not
specify which exception to the exclusionary rule applied, such as the inevitable discovery,
independent source, or attenuation doctrine. However, Mr. Tellez contends that the police
officers did not discover the contraband in his car by means sufficiency distinguishable to be
purged of the taint of his unlawful detention. It stands to reason that, if Mr. Tellez was not
unlawfully detained, he would have departed from the residence in his car. The police lacked any
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to seize Mr. Tellez’s car and to require that he depart
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without it. There was no evidence that Mr. Tellez’s car was mentioned in the search warrant. The
dog sniff, which was done “after the search warrant or during the search warrant,” (Tr., p.58,
Ls.14–15), provided the sole basis for the car’s seizure. If Mr. Tellez was not unlawfully
detained, and therefore free to leave, the police would not have had the opportunity to conduct a
dog sniff on his car. Alternatively, Mr. Tellez submits that this case should be remanded for a
new suppression hearing to allow for further factual findings (and argument by the parties)
regarding any potential exception to the exclusionary rule.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Tellez respectfully requests that this Court reverse or vacate the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2018.

___________/s/______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

19

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of January, 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S.
Mail, addressed to:
ISRAEL CASTRO TELLEZ
506 E ELGIN ST
CALDWELL ID 83605
GEORGE A SOUTHWORTH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
RYAN DOWELL
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
_________/s/________________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCS/eas

20

